Sunday, January 31, 2010

The Formation of Concepts - 'The Archaeology of Knowledge' by Michel Foucault

Concepts are rarely placed in a virtual deductive edifice, but rather the field where concepts first appeared and were circulated can be defined as:

a)      Being organised in forms of succession –
-          in ordering of enunciative series – for example reasonings, inferences, descriptions, generalisations;
-          in ordering types of dependence of the statements;
-          the rhetorical schemata by which statements may be combined.

b)       Having forms of coexistence. These include -
-          a field of presence
which is the collection of statements acknowledged as forming the background to a field, established by relations in ‘experimental verification, logical validation, mere repetition, commentary, tradition, analysis of error, a search for hidden meanings.
-          a field of concomitance
which are statements belonging to different domains of objects but become relevant here as a source of analogy or as a higher principle to which it is possible to refer
-          a field of memory
which are statements no longer accepted or discussed as relevant to the concept, but which historically plays an important part in the formation of the concept.

c)       Identified by procedures of intervention which appear as –
-          techniques of rewriting (the changing way of defining chemical composition over the Classical period, for example)
-          methods of transcribing (a more versus less formal language use, for example)
-          modes of translating (qualitative into quantitative approximations, delimited, transferred, or systematised propositions, as appropriate).

Discursive formations are most defined by the links between these elements – the way the ordering of description might be related to the technique of rewriting. In this method it is not sought that we arrive at a valid and reliable analysis of any one particular concept – rather, we look for how recurrent elements of statements reappear, dissociate, recompose, extend, are absorbed into new logic, acquire new semantic content. We define at a preconceptual level the field by where the concept can exist, and the rules to which it is subjected.

Foucault gives an example from ‘The Order of Things’ analysing General Grammar in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, where he identifies a schema of attribution, articulation, designation and derivation as useful for discovering:
1.       What forms of succession are possible in analyses of nouns, verbs, adjectives, phonetics, syntax.
2.       How a domain of validity including its normativity and actuality is constituted.
3.       What relations General Grammar has with Maths, Natural History, and so forth.
4.       How various conceptions are possible for statements such as ‘to be’, or for proper and common nouns, for example.

The preconceptual level is not a definition apropos reality or a horizon of ideality. It is not proposed at the level of the discourse itself  - rather it looks to and for the emergence of concepts. It is not a series of abstractions – rather the rules of formation emerge as apparent not only in the mind of individuals, but in the discourse itself, with uniform anonymity.

Ref:

Foucault, M. (1969). The Archaeology of Knowledge. London: Routledge.


Wednesday, January 27, 2010

The Formation of Enunciative Modalities - 'The Archaeology of Knowledge' by Michel Foucault

This chapter looks at the laws operating behind diverse statements, and in fact asks:

a)      Who is speaking? Who uses this language and is qualified to do so? How does he/she presume that what she says is right and true? Who is permitted to proffer such a discourse? The title of doctor, for example, involves criteria of competence and knowledge, pedagogic norms, legal conditions. There are systems of differentiation and relations - for example attributions, hierarchical subordinations, functional complementarities,  exchanges of information.

b)      From what institutional sites has this individual made their discourse? Is it a place of constant, coded systematic observation (like a hospital) or is it a field where background and environment can be acknowledged (the documentary field)

c)       The enunciations of the subject are also in part determined by the relations between the various domains she occupies. These grids of explicit or implicit interrogation give the subject a certain stance – she asks certain questions, perceives  certain things within the boundaries of relevant information, occupies particular places in information networks. These enunciations, allowed to the subject by certain social discourse, thus changes substantially in availability and optimality over time.

It can be imagined then that there is substantial disparity regarding the types of enunciation possible in a field of discourse. These cannot be reduced to a single founding act or to a founding consciousness. Enunciative modalities allow space for the occupation of many perspectives – the modalities show up the field of dispersion, and it is not by recourse to a transcendental subject nor to a psychological subjectivity that the regulation of enunciations should be defined.

Ref:

Foucault, M. (1969). The Archaeology of Knowledge. London: Routledge.

The Formation of Objects - 'The Archaeology of Knowledge' by Michel Foucault

Foucault suggests for an abstract field that represents a discipline, map:

1)      The surfaces of emergence
According to the theory, where do we find what is designated and analysed. This shifts over time as to content, but this gives us a means of limiting the domain, of defining what it is talking about, and of making it manifest and describable.

2)      Authorities of delimitation
Which bodies or institutions are responsible for setting the rules – medicine, law, religion, professional bodies and sometimes literary and art critiques have all had a hand in helping define ‘psychology’ for example.

3)      Grids of specification
Systems according to which the field is divided, contrasted, related, regrouped, classified and derived from one another.

A description thus derived is still inadequate because objects so defined are not neatly layed out, by virtue of the above definition, one after the other. Rather, the coordinates of the map interact, substantially, and these relations, and the way that these relations are formed in the real world, are highly dispersed.

These objects only exist in positive conditions of a complex group of relations. The relations are not present in the object, and are not deployed when the object is being analysed, the relations themselves do not reveal the immanent web of rationality among them.

The relations referred to above should not be confused with primary relations – definitive relationships between institutions, for example. The relations of dependence at the primary level are not necessarily what makes the formation of objects at the discursive level possible. A discursive space unfolds articulated with possible discourses – a system of real, primary relations and reflexive, secondary relations.

Discursive relations are neither interior (defining of a certain rhetorical structure) nor exterior (imposing limits upon) statements. They are at the limit of discourse, characterising not the language that is used, nor the circumstances within which the discourse is employed, but they delineate discourse itself, as a practice.

So, the unity of a discourse is completed through the setting up of relations that characterises the discursive practice to discover not a configuration, or a form, but a group of rules that is immanent in a practice, and define it in its specificity. Of the term that is used to describe a field, we can discover it’s etymology, but this is not the same as the emergence of unity of use of the term over time, which is defined by a reflexive, secondary, classificatory rubric.

In looking at the field of psychopathology now, for example, we are typically trying to reconstitute it into something that it is not, nor neutralise the present discourse in its own presently engaged signs and symbols, rather, we are attempting to conjure up these symbols, in their ‘rich, heavy, immediate plenitude (pg 52). The symbols are typically regarded as a primitive law of discourse, an irrelevant tradition, or perhaps even as an unconscious desire, not seen nor directly spoken.

We seek to define these objects without reference to the ground, the foundation of things but by relating them to the body of rules that enable them to form as objects of a discourse and thus constitute the conditions of their historical appearance.

Note that this is not the analysis of lexical content nor the semantic structure that appears at the surface of a discourse that has already been spoken. Rather we look at a tangled plurality, at once superimposed and incomplete.

A quote from the great man himself:

‘I would like to show that ‘discourses’, in the form in which they can be heard or read, are not, as one might expect, a mere intersection of things and words: an obscure web of things, and a manifest, visible, coloured chain of words; I would like to show that discourse is not a slender surface of contact, or confrontation, between a reality and a language, the intrication of lexicon and an experience; I would like to show with precise examples that in analysing discourses themselves, one sees the loosening of the embrace, apparently so tight, of words and things, and the emergence of a group of rules proper to discursive practice.

These rules define not the dumb existence of a reality, nor the canonical use of a vocabulary, but the ordering of objects. The task of articulating these rules consists not in treating discourses as a group of signs but as practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak.'

Ref:

Foucault. M. (1969). The Archaeology of Knowledge, London: Routledge.

Wednesday, January 20, 2010

Obscure Mythology


It's not in the archetype of the Queen, the Nun or the Deaconess that I find myself really,

Childhood lost at 4
Child gained at 21
And lost at 22
Spiritual marriage untied by fate
Asceticism sewn through addiction
To fall over, tired
And be reborn, anew, at 31.

The bare bones might speak to an age old pattern, tread worn through time
But the lived detail begs that I acknowledge the star

The imagination, enlivened by the Nirmanakaya, the Sambhogakaya, the Dharmakaya,

(the pure, the non differentiated, the non discriminated)

The magic of the words half understood, half uttered, half met,
And the cold, empty structures,
That grace me with the space to breathe,

with life.

Monday, December 28, 2009

Discursive Formations


I've picked up Foucault's 'The Archaeology of Knowledge' from Macquarie University library, and I'm deeply in love. It seems odd that adoption of postmodernity through the psychology-oriented disciplines that I study means mostly, at a maximum, that we aim to contextualise our knowledge. That's odd because in this book, Foucault outlines such a deeper process that he purports is vital in understanding the unity of a discipline, the discipline in question for me being psychology. It's perhaps not so odd in that Foucault states that he demands this deeper process understanding in order to maximise his sense of felt control over his subject matter, so it is unlikely to be a system that meets anyone else's demands in terms of necessary rigor in deconstructing a word, a book, or an oeuvre.

Nevertheless, I want to record his four hypotheses of 'discursive formations' in order that I contemplate their relation to knowledge. Broadly these conform to 'objects, mode of statement, concepts, thematic choices'.


Objects

'Statements different in form, and dispersed in time, form a group if they refer to one and the same object'.

But, 'psychology' as an object, now, does not equate to what was considered as pscyhology in 1890 or even 1960. We need to know more about the space in which psychology is fashioned over time - there is an interplay of rules that define transformation of the psychology object, and indeed, outlining these will formulate laws of division which separate them, in time.


Mode of Statement

A group of relations between statements can be defined by the forms and types of connexions, themselves. For example medicine in the 19th century was characterised by certain types of descriptive statements. Knowledge is mediated by observations made via instruments, statistical calculations, epidemiological observations, perceptual descriptions and therapeutic practice. A transformation takes place in the types of statements themselves, as well as in their relationship, over time.


Concepts

This method involves hierarchical organisation of statements - Foucault provides the example of Classical grammar - judgement defined as the general normative form of any sentence, subject and predicate being grouped under 'noun', verb being used for logical copula. But, new emerging forms throw a spanner in the works - these forms may apply to emerging concepts or pre-existing ones, arranged in a new way.


Thematic choices

The identity and persistence of themes is another proposal for identification of unitary forms - capable of linking, animating discourses, like an organism with it's own internal force, and capacity for survival. It is possible, however to identify different themes for the same idea - for evolution, as per Foucault's example, we see the idea of kinship as the most important aspect in 18th century thought, but by the 19th century describing discontinous groups and their interactions with the environment had greater explanatory value of the work of the field.

These four are the rules of discursive formation of a field, in themselves far from perfect, but together helping to delineate, in a deeper way (than is the typical) the abstract fields of knowledge that we so take for granted in striving in the academic environment.

En-amour-ed, indeed. Bring on the interiority and the promise, yea.


Ref: Foucault, M. (1969). L'Archeologie du saviour -The Archaeology of Knowledge. London: Routledge

Geropsychology

This is why I am completing another degree - with grace and hard work, maybe I can assist the effort being undertaken at this end of the human developmental spectrum, one day.




DEBORAH ANNE KODER & EDWARD HELMES Australian Psychologist, March 2008; 43(1): 22 – 26

Abstract

Little recent objective evidence exists to qualify past concerns regarding the low numbers of psychologists working with older adults in Australia. The present study reports on figures from two surveys of Australian psychologists, finding that of the 1,699 psychologists surveyed, only 6% specialise in treating older adults. This figure is comparable to those from studies conducted overseas, where more training and employment opportunities are available. Reasons for such low figures are explored together with recommendations to meet the future demand for psychological services as the proportion of elderly adults within the Australian population increases.



From the conclusion:

'The challenge for clinical psychology is to provide quality opportunities (within training and employment) for clinical exposure to older adults as well as to promote their services within both referring agents and the client group themselves.'

Let's see if that doesn't keep me focussed on developing a Working with the Elderly component of the MUPS Volunteer Program. :)

Sunday, December 27, 2009

Still Days

I took Millie for a walk this afternoon in the rain, and found some purple agapanthus in full bloom. Crouching down beside the plants, and holding my hand under the blooms, as the rain dripped onto the flower and puddled in my palm, I breathed into the realisation that I'm smack in the middle of Still Days.

Still Days are a little like what I romanticise convent life could be, if I could live for a little while within cloistered walls, wearing a cloistered uniform. Still Days are a step removed from everyday buzzing, squarking world, where instead energetically I'm most attuned to quiet realisation of cyclical nature, cyclical thoughts, and cyclical experience.

Still Days have upsides and downsides. On the up, that sharp stilling allows greater space to see and appreciate the tiny minute changes that are always and everywhere taking place, in our environment, and in ourselves. There's a reason why cloistered nuns shine with so much welcoming when us laypeople visit for a day, I think - when repetition of the Divine Office, day in and day out, is the lynchpin upon which your material, soulful and spiritual life is centered, ingress from the outside world, change, of course is likely to register as a blessed experience. There's less of a need for big travelling-round-the-world stimulus, because every visit from every sentient being, right here, in this space, becomes a holiday in and of itself.

Still Days have their own healing within them - dropping into a meditative awareness of the space between my horizontal heartbeat and the vertical rise and fall of the breath means I focus a little more often on my accompanying mantra, 'but for these, I would not be'. It's possible that the 'healing' occurs because I value the heartbeat and the breath a little more highly for simply having heard them properly. There's nothing like deepening my sensitivity to the inescapability of my own end to help me align my praxis with my highest intent, too.

Still Day downsides turn easily, unchecked, into dark days. Having listened to Reggie Ray, a self-styled Vajra Master be interviewed by Tami Simon recently, I'd love to see more support come through from Christianity to assist those who choose to walk (choose, to walk) through dark days into a deeper understanding of themselves. Reggie talked of dark retreats in the Vajrayana tradition, where, with some evidence of psychological resilience in hand, meditators take themselves into a darkened room for an extended period, and encounter a lowered barrier between the unconscious and conscious mind.

In a small way, Still Days lend themselves to this effect - sharpened awareness in my own company of my own company shortens the length of time between my unconscious reactions, and me seeing them for what they really are. It means I encounter my naked, often unflattering mind streams in all their repetitious angst. There's a learning of the rampant mind games of ecstasy and tortured agony that will echo loudly in the stillness, there's choosing to sit and let all that simply play out or deciding to use whatever's goin' on to ramp up my joy or anger.

I've been in an energetic limbo since mid-November, when a lovely priest (thanks again, if you do drop by here, Fr. Tim+) kept me company online as I shifted, in both a felt bodily and sensed-spirited way, into a place where, forgive me, but I know not from whence I came. It's that kind of place where I sense I have to 'do some time', before another download of energetic pull/push comes my way, and I reconcile myself into the world again, in some way anointed and renewed.

There's been a hectic examination period, the inception of the silly season, a couple of month ends and all the usual daily maya melodrama, and I haven't allowed myself space to sit in my Still Days. Here's a call, to me, to put down the books, the astrology charts, the paintbrushes and the distractions, at least once a day, and sit with this Still Day thing.

I miss the fluttery cerebral sensations at the back of my head. :)