Wednesday, February 10, 2010

Defining the Statement - 'The Archaeology of Knowledge' by Michel Foucault

In adopting an attitude that seeks to investigate the emergence of discursive formation, Foucault has  enquired into:
-          The emergence of objects;
-          The system of the appearance and distribution of enunciative modes;
-          The system of the placing and dispersion of concepts;
-          The system of deployment of strategic choices.
In doing so, Foucault proposes that perhaps he was seeking to identify the ground of a statement, as it arose out of the field of formless discourse.
Examining his use of the term ‘statement’ – Foucault identifies that he used the word to refer to both a population of statements, and as a point of distinction from his use of the word ‘discourses’ (ie as a part distinguished from the whole).
On first glance, he proposes, statements look indivisible – ‘a point without a surface, but a point that can be located in planes of division and in specific forms of groupings...the atom of discourse’. Looking at whether a statement equates with a proposition which equates with a sentence which equates with a speech act, Foucault proposes that none of these equations are true. It is not propositional structure that defines statements – ‘no one heard’ is propositionally indistinct from ‘It is true that no one heard’, and yet, for ‘no one heard’ we understand an observation is being made, whereas for the second statement ‘it is true that no one heard’ we read a dialogue or an interior monologue. Distinct enunciative characteristics emerge in each case.
Statements do not equate to sentences – a simple nominal syntagma (‘That man!’) an adverb (‘Absolutely’) or a personal pronoun (‘You’) all are not defined by the typical subject-copula-predicate structure of a canonical sentence. Foucault also points to classificatory tables for Latin or botanical species, genealogical trees, and accounting reports as existing as ‘statements’ that do not conform to the grammatical characteristics of the sentence.
The speech act isolates an act of formulation in it’s emergence, be it a promise , an order, a decree, a contract, an agreement or an observation, each in it’s own specific circumstances. Speech acts however often have criteria that determine their form outside of the criteria that legitimates a statement – an oath, a prayer, a contract or a promise all have distinct formulas and separate sentences. Speech acts will often constitute more than one statement.
Statements are less charged and more omnipresent than sentences, propositions or speech acts. One way to characterise a statement might be to say that it is a series of signs, figures, marks and traces, and then invoke grammar to define whether it is a sentence, invoke logic to indicate whether propositional form is apparent, and analysis to determine whether it is a speech act or otherwise.

Statements do not exist in the same way, or at the same level, that a language exists – the signs that make up the elements of a language are forms that are imposed upon statements and control them from within. If there were no statements, language would not exist, but no statement is indispensable for a language to exist. Language exists as a system that allows construction of statements, but in another respect it exists only as a description obtained from a collection of real statements.
Foucault undertakes the analysis of a string of haphazardly typed letters, and proposes that this may or may not constitute a statement, depending on the context of the construction. A statement is not an object presented for inspection, with limits and independence. It is not so much an element among others, or a function vertically situated in relation to other units and it is not a structure. It is a function of existence that properly belongs to signs an on the basis of which one may then decide through analysis or intuition, whether or not they make sense.

Ref:

Foucault, M. (1969). The Archaeology of Knowledge. London: Routledge.

Tuesday, February 9, 2010

The Formation of Strategies - 'The Archaeology of Knowledge' by Michel Foucault

Organisation of concepts, via what may be a regrouping of objects, of certain modalities or types of enunciation, occurs in statements of theme or theory. Foucault names these themes and theories as ‘strategies’, and identifies the problem of discovering how they are distributed in history. Necessity or chance may define the links between them.
Madness and Civilisation is identified by Foucault as being a discursive formation where the ‘theoretical points of choice’ were easy to locate, the conceptual systems were few and easy to identify, the enunciative rules were repetitive and homogenous, but also for which the emergence of the theoretical points was a highly complex and interwoven web.
Looking over his progress in other works, Foucault summarises the directions for research as:
1.       Finding the points of diffraction in a discourse –
Incompatibilities
Equivalences
And links of systematisation
So, for these equivalent but incompatible elements a coherent series of objects, forms of statement and concepts has been derived (and new points of incompatibility arise in each series). Note that the description opens up a field of possible options and enables various mutually exclusive architectures to appear, either through time or in the same instance.

2.       An economy of discursive constellation will emerge and need to be described as the guiding authority for that which has been chosen as that to be enunciated. This may take form as appropriate to the context – for example applications of semantic fields will provide different authorities to those of the concrete models for General Grammar as they were defined in the 16th century. Discourses may also be defined as an analogy, an opposition or a complementarity in relation to the first field. Sometimes there is a mutual delimitation that emerges where a differentiation according to the domain of application becomes apparent and pertinent (the distinction made in history between psychiatry and medicine being one example that has had significant implications for emerging theory and practice by psychiatrists and doctors since that time).

3.       Theoretical choices that are made are usually dependent upon the existence and acts of another authority, in a field of non-discursive practices.
-          The rules and processes of appropriation of the discourse and
-          The possible positions of desire in relation to the discourse.

An example offered by Foucault is the existence of the field of General Grammar as occurring within the pedagogical space of the Western 17th century. I love his last sentence:
‘[The authorities] are not disturbing elements which, superimposing themselves upon its pure, neutral, atemporal, silent form, suppress its true voice and emit in its place a travestied discourse, but on the contrary, [are] its formative elements.’

Maybe I just like the word travesty. J

A basis of the same set of relations for a series of strategies is therefore indicative of an individualised discursive formation. Per Foucault, it is important to recognise that there is no anterior, silent choice that lies as an originating point for these strategies. Strategies are not world-views neatly coined into words, nor are they a ‘hypocritical translation of an interest masquerading under the pretext of a theory’. Rather, the strategies are systematic ways of:
-          Treating a discourse (delimiting, regrouping, separating, linking objects and making them derive from one another;
-          Arranging forms of enunciation (choosing, placing and constituting a series)
-          Manipulating concepts (giving them rules for use, inserting them into regional coherences and thus creating conceptual architectures.

‘These strategies are not seeds of discourse, they are regulated ways...of practicing the possibilities of discourse.’ Foucault steps firmly away from idealism, identifying that there is no perfect, ultimate or timeless discourse. There is no intermingling of discourses for nature or the economy, for example – one that would proceed slowly, accumulating and completing (something described in the teleological confines of history), the other perpetually rupturing into heterogeneous fragments. There is no fundamental project or secondary play of opinions in the formation of an object.

Ref: 

Foucault, M. (1969). The Archaeology of Knowledge. London: Routledge.

Sunday, February 7, 2010

Halo

The song is 'The Noose' by A Perfect Circle. This video clip includes clips from the movie 'The Shawshank Redemption'. I've potentially violated copyright about three times over, right here, but these pieces of art help me to say what I need to say.



So glad to see you well
Overcome and completely silent now
With heaven's help
You cast your demons out
And not to pull your halo down
Around your neck and tug you off your cloud
But I'm more than just a little curious
How you're planning to go about
Making your amends to the dead
To the dead

Recall the deeds as if
They're all someone else's
Atrocious stories
Now you stand reborn before us all
So glad to see you well

And not to pull your halo down
Around your neck and tug you to the ground
But I'm more than just a little curious
How you're planning to go about
Making your amends to the dead
To the dead

With your halo slipping down
Your halo slipping
Your halo slipping down
Your halo slipping down
Your halo slipping down 
[repeated]

Your halo slipping down to choke you now.



'The Noose' by A Perfect Circle.


In the prayers after the consecration in the Canon of the Roman Mass, there is an invocation of the saints. At the beginning of this prayer, there are three words that are enunciated quite clearly in Latin, amongst all the otherwise whispered prayers. At the same time as saying them, the priest strikes his chest in an act of contrition: 'Nobis quoque peccatoribus', 'to us sinners'. Acknowledging that we are far removed from God, we ask for a 'part and fellowship' in the lives of the saints (and almost half of them are women, so perhaps it's 'part and ladyship', too).


In a postmodern, post-linear world, permitting that a priest label us as 'sinners', and being reminded through the Tridentine liturgy over and over again how sinful and sorrowful and broken we are seems about as attractive a proposition as dragging your knuckles over a cheese grater.


So, there is that. 


What does this have to do with the song 'The Noose'? I hear you cry. The funny thing is, that I'm more accountable, myself, to this song than I have ever been to a priest in a confessional, or to a weighty feeling of besmirched transgression prior to communion in a Mass.


This song, to me, speaks to one of my favourite St Teresa of Avila paraphrases - 'be stern with yourself, but kind to everybody else'. This song talks to the part of myself that wants to see myself in the most angelic light possible, in all times at all places, renewed, immutable, perfected. In lore, angels have an awareness that extend far beyond our mere human capacity to see and know. This song talks to the part of me that has an inkling of that 'eternity', and this song creates a space where I don't get away with not confronting the limitless harm that all of us, each of us, but definitely I at a minimum have a potential to, and at worst could deliberately inflict upon, the sentient beings that are around us.


By virtue of this song, I'm forced to a place of honesty that asks that I walk each step acknowledging, as much as I can, the harm that I might have caused to another person. Any other person. This song demands that I make amends for the wrongs I have wittingly and unwittingly committed, to other people, fully knowing that, once the acts are committed, they are, in a sense, 'dead'. There is no going backwards, just onwards.




Nobis quoque peccatoribus famulis tuis, de multitudine miserationum tuarum sperantibus, partem aliquam, et societatem donare digneris, cum tuis sanctis Apostolis et Martyribus: cum Joanne, Stephano, Matthia, Barnaba, Ignatio, Alexandro, Marcellino, Petro, Felicitate, Perpetua, Agatha, Lucia, Agnete, Caecilia, Anastasia, et omnibus Sanctis tuis: intra quorum nos consortium, non aeistimator meriti, sed veniae, quaesumus, largitor admitte.




To us also, Thy sinful servants, confiding in the multitude of Thy mercies, vouchsafe to grant us some part and fellowship with Thy holy apostles and martyrs; with John, Stephen, Mathias, Barnabas, Ignatius, Alexander, Marcellinus, Peter, Felicity, Perpetua, Agatha, Lucy, Agnes, Cecily, Anastasia, and with all Thy Saints, into whose company we beseech Thee to admit us, not weighing our merits, but pardoning our differences.




Good grief. Just when I think I'm past the need for God enunciations.



Sunday, January 31, 2010

The Formation of Concepts - 'The Archaeology of Knowledge' by Michel Foucault

Concepts are rarely placed in a virtual deductive edifice, but rather the field where concepts first appeared and were circulated can be defined as:

a)      Being organised in forms of succession –
-          in ordering of enunciative series – for example reasonings, inferences, descriptions, generalisations;
-          in ordering types of dependence of the statements;
-          the rhetorical schemata by which statements may be combined.

b)       Having forms of coexistence. These include -
-          a field of presence
which is the collection of statements acknowledged as forming the background to a field, established by relations in ‘experimental verification, logical validation, mere repetition, commentary, tradition, analysis of error, a search for hidden meanings.
-          a field of concomitance
which are statements belonging to different domains of objects but become relevant here as a source of analogy or as a higher principle to which it is possible to refer
-          a field of memory
which are statements no longer accepted or discussed as relevant to the concept, but which historically plays an important part in the formation of the concept.

c)       Identified by procedures of intervention which appear as –
-          techniques of rewriting (the changing way of defining chemical composition over the Classical period, for example)
-          methods of transcribing (a more versus less formal language use, for example)
-          modes of translating (qualitative into quantitative approximations, delimited, transferred, or systematised propositions, as appropriate).

Discursive formations are most defined by the links between these elements – the way the ordering of description might be related to the technique of rewriting. In this method it is not sought that we arrive at a valid and reliable analysis of any one particular concept – rather, we look for how recurrent elements of statements reappear, dissociate, recompose, extend, are absorbed into new logic, acquire new semantic content. We define at a preconceptual level the field by where the concept can exist, and the rules to which it is subjected.

Foucault gives an example from ‘The Order of Things’ analysing General Grammar in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, where he identifies a schema of attribution, articulation, designation and derivation as useful for discovering:
1.       What forms of succession are possible in analyses of nouns, verbs, adjectives, phonetics, syntax.
2.       How a domain of validity including its normativity and actuality is constituted.
3.       What relations General Grammar has with Maths, Natural History, and so forth.
4.       How various conceptions are possible for statements such as ‘to be’, or for proper and common nouns, for example.

The preconceptual level is not a definition apropos reality or a horizon of ideality. It is not proposed at the level of the discourse itself  - rather it looks to and for the emergence of concepts. It is not a series of abstractions – rather the rules of formation emerge as apparent not only in the mind of individuals, but in the discourse itself, with uniform anonymity.

Ref:

Foucault, M. (1969). The Archaeology of Knowledge. London: Routledge.


Wednesday, January 27, 2010

The Formation of Enunciative Modalities - 'The Archaeology of Knowledge' by Michel Foucault

This chapter looks at the laws operating behind diverse statements, and in fact asks:

a)      Who is speaking? Who uses this language and is qualified to do so? How does he/she presume that what she says is right and true? Who is permitted to proffer such a discourse? The title of doctor, for example, involves criteria of competence and knowledge, pedagogic norms, legal conditions. There are systems of differentiation and relations - for example attributions, hierarchical subordinations, functional complementarities,  exchanges of information.

b)      From what institutional sites has this individual made their discourse? Is it a place of constant, coded systematic observation (like a hospital) or is it a field where background and environment can be acknowledged (the documentary field)

c)       The enunciations of the subject are also in part determined by the relations between the various domains she occupies. These grids of explicit or implicit interrogation give the subject a certain stance – she asks certain questions, perceives  certain things within the boundaries of relevant information, occupies particular places in information networks. These enunciations, allowed to the subject by certain social discourse, thus changes substantially in availability and optimality over time.

It can be imagined then that there is substantial disparity regarding the types of enunciation possible in a field of discourse. These cannot be reduced to a single founding act or to a founding consciousness. Enunciative modalities allow space for the occupation of many perspectives – the modalities show up the field of dispersion, and it is not by recourse to a transcendental subject nor to a psychological subjectivity that the regulation of enunciations should be defined.

Ref:

Foucault, M. (1969). The Archaeology of Knowledge. London: Routledge.

The Formation of Objects - 'The Archaeology of Knowledge' by Michel Foucault

Foucault suggests for an abstract field that represents a discipline, map:

1)      The surfaces of emergence
According to the theory, where do we find what is designated and analysed. This shifts over time as to content, but this gives us a means of limiting the domain, of defining what it is talking about, and of making it manifest and describable.

2)      Authorities of delimitation
Which bodies or institutions are responsible for setting the rules – medicine, law, religion, professional bodies and sometimes literary and art critiques have all had a hand in helping define ‘psychology’ for example.

3)      Grids of specification
Systems according to which the field is divided, contrasted, related, regrouped, classified and derived from one another.

A description thus derived is still inadequate because objects so defined are not neatly layed out, by virtue of the above definition, one after the other. Rather, the coordinates of the map interact, substantially, and these relations, and the way that these relations are formed in the real world, are highly dispersed.

These objects only exist in positive conditions of a complex group of relations. The relations are not present in the object, and are not deployed when the object is being analysed, the relations themselves do not reveal the immanent web of rationality among them.

The relations referred to above should not be confused with primary relations – definitive relationships between institutions, for example. The relations of dependence at the primary level are not necessarily what makes the formation of objects at the discursive level possible. A discursive space unfolds articulated with possible discourses – a system of real, primary relations and reflexive, secondary relations.

Discursive relations are neither interior (defining of a certain rhetorical structure) nor exterior (imposing limits upon) statements. They are at the limit of discourse, characterising not the language that is used, nor the circumstances within which the discourse is employed, but they delineate discourse itself, as a practice.

So, the unity of a discourse is completed through the setting up of relations that characterises the discursive practice to discover not a configuration, or a form, but a group of rules that is immanent in a practice, and define it in its specificity. Of the term that is used to describe a field, we can discover it’s etymology, but this is not the same as the emergence of unity of use of the term over time, which is defined by a reflexive, secondary, classificatory rubric.

In looking at the field of psychopathology now, for example, we are typically trying to reconstitute it into something that it is not, nor neutralise the present discourse in its own presently engaged signs and symbols, rather, we are attempting to conjure up these symbols, in their ‘rich, heavy, immediate plenitude (pg 52). The symbols are typically regarded as a primitive law of discourse, an irrelevant tradition, or perhaps even as an unconscious desire, not seen nor directly spoken.

We seek to define these objects without reference to the ground, the foundation of things but by relating them to the body of rules that enable them to form as objects of a discourse and thus constitute the conditions of their historical appearance.

Note that this is not the analysis of lexical content nor the semantic structure that appears at the surface of a discourse that has already been spoken. Rather we look at a tangled plurality, at once superimposed and incomplete.

A quote from the great man himself:

‘I would like to show that ‘discourses’, in the form in which they can be heard or read, are not, as one might expect, a mere intersection of things and words: an obscure web of things, and a manifest, visible, coloured chain of words; I would like to show that discourse is not a slender surface of contact, or confrontation, between a reality and a language, the intrication of lexicon and an experience; I would like to show with precise examples that in analysing discourses themselves, one sees the loosening of the embrace, apparently so tight, of words and things, and the emergence of a group of rules proper to discursive practice.

These rules define not the dumb existence of a reality, nor the canonical use of a vocabulary, but the ordering of objects. The task of articulating these rules consists not in treating discourses as a group of signs but as practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak.'

Ref:

Foucault. M. (1969). The Archaeology of Knowledge, London: Routledge.

Wednesday, January 20, 2010

Obscure Mythology


It's not in the archetype of the Queen, the Nun or the Deaconess that I find myself really,

Childhood lost at 4
Child gained at 21
And lost at 22
Spiritual marriage untied by fate
Asceticism sewn through addiction
To fall over, tired
And be reborn, anew, at 31.

The bare bones might speak to an age old pattern, tread worn through time
But the lived detail begs that I acknowledge the star

The imagination, enlivened by the Nirmanakaya, the Sambhogakaya, the Dharmakaya,

(the pure, the non differentiated, the non discriminated)

The magic of the words half understood, half uttered, half met,
And the cold, empty structures,
That grace me with the space to breathe,

with life.