Listening to Philosophy Bites recently, I was intrigued by an interview with Susan Neiman, Director of the Einstein Forum, who proposes that we have yet to fully and deeply appreciate and reconcile the values introduced to our culture, apropos The Enlightenment.
She uses much 'we' language in the interview - I like this, in this context, because by virtue of it she hands us back the responsibility, as Westerners, to examine how, and why, Fundamentalism becomes attractive to some people in a liberal culture. She asks us to examine what we of progressive Western values have done to provoke conservative response - to consider is it possible that part of what is sought in Fundamental movements is an attempt retrieve something more than what materialistic late capitalism provides. By establishing that this is the case, we can start to review what might be sought in terms of values by those that orient to conservative modes of being and dialectic.
She then prods and pokes the Enlightenment, to reveal four robust values that may have self-transformative potential, and thus may have been undervalued, in our rush away from the perceived emphasis on reason, to the exclusion of all other modes of knowing, in unfortunate by-products of the aftermath (ha!) of the Age of Rationalism.
Firstly, Neiman proposes we re-visit happiness - to look at the relativism with which it might be considered, but to not capitulate to that relativism. By this means, we can know that 'money does not but happiness', and we can be prevented from projecting happiness into a Golden Age in the past or the Heavenly future. Self-criticism may ask that we intervene on behalf of others, to fully express our own happiness - happiness is not an end-state passive consumption, but an active principle of giving back to the world.
The second Enlightenment value she asks that we look at is reason - not the caricatured emotionless, passionless version of reason, rather the opposition to blind authority that reason can represent. The Enlightenment asks in the public sphere that we jsutify and argue about our reasons in a transparent way.
The third value is reverence - the Enlightenment may have been against institutionalised religion, but the demand to ethically think for yourself is at the beginning of the Hebrew Bible, and Neiman leans on this to present a reverence through the principle of understanding - a seeking to engage, in awe of, and in gratitude extended to, that which we seek to know. Whatever the world is, we know that we did not make it, and Neiman proposes that this recognition may indeed be a reconciling factor between the secular and the religious.
The final value is hope. In necessary industrial progress, no century was more concerned with the existence of evil - they made fun of optimism (as per Voltaire's Candide) but they did believe that human beings could lend effort to improve the world. 300 years ago it was standard for people to be drawn and quartered in the centre of town, with tickets sold. Torture, in this form, was abolished, and intriguingly, we have it back now. The Enlightenment offered regression, at the same time as progress, and the existence of both of these principles, simultaneously, is something worthwhile to consider in light of Cheney and Rumsfeld and the power of certain individuals in power. She comes out as rejecting pessimism as cowardly, and proposes that in light of the chance for human action to make a difference, we become responsible for ourselves, and others.
The interview was more interesting to listen to than I seem to have made it sound here. I think, partly, I'm a little bit in love with the reactionary idea, that the Enlightenment has more crunchy goodness in it than we've extracted from our historical Caesar Salad, yet.
Sunday, July 4, 2010
Thursday, July 1, 2010
Intercept of Time and Timelessness
From TS Elliot's 'Dry Salvages':
'Men's curiosity searches past and future
And clings to that dimension. But to apprehend
The point of intersection of the timeless
With time, is an occupation for the saint--
No occupation either, but something given
And taken, in a lifetime's death in love,
Ardour and selflessness and self-surrender.
For most of us, there is only the unattended
Moment, the moment in and out of time.'
Monday, June 21, 2010
Connectedness
'It is not as if an 'I' exists independently over here and then simply loses a 'you' over there, especially if the attachment to 'you' is a part of what composes who 'I' am as well. I think I have lost 'you' only to discover 'I' have gone missing as well. There is a relationality that is composed neither exclusively of myself nor you, but it is to be conceived as the tie by which those terms are differentiated and related.'
Butler, J. (2003). Violence, Mourning, Politics. Studies in Gender and Sexuality, 4, 9-37.
Butler, J. (2003). Violence, Mourning, Politics. Studies in Gender and Sexuality, 4, 9-37.
Sunday, June 20, 2010
Love is as strong as death
Love is strong as death,
jealousy as relentless as Sheol.
The flash of it is a flash of fire,
a flame of the Lord himself.
Love no floods can quench,
no torrents drown.
Song of Songs 8:6-7
I'm a little early for None, today. Studying has this incredible effect, of making my eye rove, ahead. Today's readings for the Hours work incredibly well through the three levels of spirit, for my mind:
At the level of the body:
Terce (Morning Prayer)
Your body, you know, is the temple of the Holy Spirit, who is in you since you received him from God. You are not your own property; you have been bought and paid for. That is why you should use your body for the glory of God. 1 Corinthians 6:19-20
At the level of mind/soul:
Sext (Midday Prayer)
And now, Israel, what does the Lord your God ask of you? Only this: to fear the Lord your God, to follow all his ways, to love him, to serve the Lord your God with all your heart and all your soul. Deuteronomy 10:12
And the Song of Songs above, for None (afternoon prayer) at the level of spirit. Love is as strong as death.
Ref: http://www.universalis.com/20100620/today.htm
jealousy as relentless as Sheol.
The flash of it is a flash of fire,
a flame of the Lord himself.
Love no floods can quench,
no torrents drown.
Song of Songs 8:6-7
I'm a little early for None, today. Studying has this incredible effect, of making my eye rove, ahead. Today's readings for the Hours work incredibly well through the three levels of spirit, for my mind:
At the level of the body:
Terce (Morning Prayer)
Your body, you know, is the temple of the Holy Spirit, who is in you since you received him from God. You are not your own property; you have been bought and paid for. That is why you should use your body for the glory of God. 1 Corinthians 6:19-20
At the level of mind/soul:
Sext (Midday Prayer)
And now, Israel, what does the Lord your God ask of you? Only this: to fear the Lord your God, to follow all his ways, to love him, to serve the Lord your God with all your heart and all your soul. Deuteronomy 10:12
And the Song of Songs above, for None (afternoon prayer) at the level of spirit. Love is as strong as death.
Ref: http://www.universalis.com/20100620/today.htm
Tuesday, June 15, 2010
Vulnerability and performative contradictions
'But perhaps there is some other way to live such that one becomes neither affectively dead nor mimetically violent, a way out of the circle of violence altogether. This possibility has to do with demanding a world in which the bodily vulnerability is protected without therefore being eradicated and with insisting on the line that must be walked between the two.
By insisting on a "common" corporeal vulnerability, I may seem to be positing a new basis for humanism. That might be true, but I am prone to consider this differently. A vulnerability must be perceived and recognised in order to come into play in an ethical encounter, and there is no guarantee that this will happen. Not only is there always a possibility that a vulnerability will not be recognised and that it will be constituted as the "unrecognisable", but when that vulnerability is recognised it has the power to change the meaning and structure of the vulnerability itself. In this sense, if vulnerability is one precondition of humanisation, and humanisation takes place differently through variable norms of recognition, then it follows that vulnerability is fundamentally dependent on existing norms of recognition if it is to be attributed to any human subject.
So when we say that every infant is surely vulnerable, that is clearly true; but it is true, in part, precisely because our utterance enacts the very recognition of vulnerability and shows the importance of recognition itself for sustaining vulnerability [Italics mine]. We perform the recognition by making the claim, and that is surely a very good ethical reason to make the claim. We make the claim, however, precisely because it is not meant to be taken for granted, precisely because it is not, in every instance, honoured. Vulnerability takes on another meaning at the moment it is recognised, and recognition wields the power to reconstitute vulnerability. We cannot posit this vulnerability prior to recognition without performing the very thesis that we oppose (our positing is itself a form of recognition and so manifests the constitutive power of the discourse). This framework, by which norms of recognition are essential to the constitution of vulnerability as a precondition of the human is important precisely for this reason, namely, that we need and want those norms in place, that we struggle for their establishment, and that we value their continuing and expanded operation.'
I'm praying that Doris asks a phenomenology question in the Psychoanalysis exam, next week. Some means by which I can connect the corporeal vulnerability of the human body, that which connects us, to my three-pages-in-less-than-half-an-hour essay. She is a teacher in the school of 'go deeply into that which fascinates you', and I, merely a girl-serpent, hypnotised. :)
Epistemological distance, methodological variety, ontological pluralism (from Integral Theory, link to come) - would these but constitute the building blocks for the framework for recognition Butler so passionately describes, here?
Ref:
Butler, J. (2003). Violence, Mourning, Politics. Studies in Gender and Sexuality, 4, 9-37.
Sunday, June 13, 2010
Violence, Mourning, Politics - excerpt from Judith Butler
'I find that my very formation implicates the other in me, that my own foreignness to myself, is paradoxically, the source of my ethical connection with others. I am not fully known to myself, because part of what I am is the enigmatic traces of others...I am wounded, and I find that the wound itself testifies to the fact that I am impressionable, given over to the Other in ways that I cannot fully predict or control'.
I need to come back to this paper - Butler posits that the disorientation of grief posits the 'I' in the mode of unknowingness, where mourning and grief furnish a politic, a sense of community of complex order. Loss makes a tenuous we of us all. Loss is a change that de-constitutes choice, it forces us to undergo a transformation the outcomes of which we cannot know in advance, something larger than our own cognitive plans, our own projects, our own knowings.
After exams.
Ref:
Butler, J. (2003). Violence, Mourning, Politics. Studies in Gender and Sexuality, 4, 9-37.
I need to come back to this paper - Butler posits that the disorientation of grief posits the 'I' in the mode of unknowingness, where mourning and grief furnish a politic, a sense of community of complex order. Loss makes a tenuous we of us all. Loss is a change that de-constitutes choice, it forces us to undergo a transformation the outcomes of which we cannot know in advance, something larger than our own cognitive plans, our own projects, our own knowings.
After exams.
Ref:
Butler, J. (2003). Violence, Mourning, Politics. Studies in Gender and Sexuality, 4, 9-37.
Exquisite Reception
'Attunement reveals the receptive elaboration of the intensity, shape and timing of affective expressiveness, and occurs largely out of awareness and almost automatically, while empathy requires conscious cognitive mediation. Attunement involves emotional resonance which is recast into another form of expression - a distinct form of affective transaction in it's own right, which relates to the intensity, timing and shape of behaviour. Stern's lovely example is illustrative:
'A 9-month-old girl becomes very excited about a toy and reaches for it. As she grabs for it she lets out an exuberant 'aaah!' and looks at her mother. Her mother looks back and scrunches up her shoulders and performs a terrific shimmy with her upper body, like a go-go dancer. The shimmy lasts about as long as her daughter's 'aaah!' but is equally excited, joyful and intense'.
Many things are happening in this moment. The expressive tendrils of a child's bodily experiences are recognised, held in a sharing moment by another's body, in another register, and that transformed expression is returned to the child. This is contingency for beginners. Something of the child's experience, which is outside of words, has a material effect on the interpersonal world-her mother-and that reception is conveyed to the child in a different key. The child learns not merely 'What I do makes a difference' (behavioural contingency) but 'What I experience, express, am-for-a-moment makes a difference' (experiential, receptive contingency). And the proof of that is that not only its visible, expressive reception, but it's translation into another register, which permits the child to see it again, to see it in a new way, from another's perspective. [Italics mine]. This provides for the child a non-specular reflective experience of her own bodily experience. She has the opportunity to know the reality of her own bodily and mental experience intersubjectively as much by the senses of proprioception and kinaesthesia. The child in this moment has the possibility of realizing that her experience can be detected and received, of realizing there is a mutual mentality. Not to put too fine a point on it, perhaps this experience is an affective prototype of moving towards a theory of mind; the pleasure of other minds'.
Ref:
McIlwain, D. (2007). Rezoning Pleasure: Drives and Affects in Personality Theory, Theory & Personality, 17(4), 529-561.
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