'Monks, one thing, if practiced and made much of, conduces to great thrill, great profit, great security after the toil, to mindfulness and self-possession, to the winning of knowledge and insight, to pleasant living in this very life, to the realization of the fruit of release by knowledge. What is that one thing? It is mindfulness centered on the body.'
The Buddha, Anguttara Nikaya
Tuesday, July 6, 2010
Phenomenology - a Mahamudra followup
I'm listening my way through some old Integral Naked/Integral Life recordings at the moment. One of these recordings is of Ken Wilber and Patrick Sweeney, discussing the Fourth Turning of the Dharma Wheel.
Patrick Sweeney is the lineage holder of the Karma Kagyü lineage, given by the Vidyadhara, Chögyam Trungpa Rinpoche. He is also the head of Satdharma—meaning "genuine dharma"—a Buddhist organization created with the purpose of propagating Chögyam Trungpa's unique transmission.
Patrick Sweeney is the lineage holder of the Karma Kagyü lineage, given by the Vidyadhara, Chögyam Trungpa Rinpoche. He is also the head of Satdharma—meaning "genuine dharma"—a Buddhist organization created with the purpose of propagating Chögyam Trungpa's unique transmission.
What does this have to do with phenomenology? I hear you, my beloved reader, mutter.
Patrick describes the Trikaya (three bodies) of Mahamudra in a way that I find a little more convincing than the parallel to the Christian Trinity that Wilber constructed in this conversation. (This is likely to be completely my own contraction - I have trouble identifying the Christian Father, an active creator principle, with, or as, the Ground of Being, which is the way that Wilber frames the Dharmakaya, here).
Patrick gives a different version of the essences of the trikaya. He describes that in the buddhadharma our human condition is fundamentally sane, and fundamentally, always already, pristine. Consciousness is always already open, spacious in dharmakaya, it is luminous and clear in cognitive lucidity as the sambhogakaya, and is endlessly responsive and contactable in the nirmanakaya.
What intrigued me about the interview was the 'veils' that he talks about, operating over the dharmakaya to create a subject, and the sambhogakaya to create an object, which then creates action, in the nirmanakaya. This is a contraction of our fundamental, open, spacious state, identified as a great tragedy in the Mahamudra tradition. We're considered to be stuck in a bad habit - continuously ignoring the lucidity, the pristine state, of our own minds, and we get caught thus in the 84,000 conflicting emotions.
I was struck by how antithetical this was to the use of the terms subject and object in my phenomenology readings of earlier today - how the subject and object in phenomenology actually operate as a clarifier at the level of second order reflexive experience, allowing the differentiation of this-that. Definitely not a veil.
Neither abject in spirituality, nor absorbed within transcendental philosophy, she moves in a forgotten soul.
Phenomenology via Kupers (Definitions)
Transcendental - in the Kantian sense means an investigation concerned with the ways objects are experienced, as well as the a priori conditions for the possibility for such experience and knowledge. Transcendental phenomenology focuses on the way things are given. For Husserl this means focusing on phenomena and the meanings that they have for us, and asking how these meanings are constituted. Constituted does not mean fabricated – the mind does not fabricate the world. To constitute means to bring to awareness, to disclose. Transcendental phenomenology attempts to reconstruct the structures that are underlying and making possible these constitutive achievements.
Epoche – (literally astention) is borrowed from the Greek skeptics to refer to the questioning of assumptions in order to fully examine a phenomenon. By suspending our beliefs, we are open to new experiences, we allow the object of our experience to present itself to us in new form.
Bracketing –the differential setting aside of a portion of an inquiry, so as to look to the whole. Natural attitude is set aside so that the researcher may begin with the things themselves.
Phenomenological reduction – the consideration of the basic elements of an enquiry, without concern for what is accidental or trivial. The idea of ‘Ruckfuhrung’ –drawing back from what appears to how it shows itself re-flects the inquiry from a straightforward orientation, towards consciousness. The aim of reduction is to re-achieve a direct and primitive contact with the world rather than conceptualise it. What is left over is pure transcendental ego as opposed to the concrete empirical ego. The reduction to the sphere of immanence can then be followed in heuristic, hermeneutic reduction. Methodologically this is the movement from fact to essence via eidetic reduction.
Eidetic reduction – a shift to consider things not as realities but as instances of realities, as pure possibilities rather than actualities. It is proposed that in this way essences – universal and unchangeable structures- can be determined. For Husserl, this second reduction was necessary to meet the demands of empirical, rigorous, science.
Husserlian transcendental phenomenological reduction therefore follows the Kantian notion of transcendental consciousness, the creation of time awareness through protention and retention, insomuch as self-constitution. Only based on realisation of this process of sedimentation through time can a person make their comportment transparent.
Eidos – there is free variation or imagined variation of a reduced thing to a common eidos, or variation that changes. These variations can be put into the service of analysis – seeing aesthetic forms, manifesting empathy, improvisation through now-ness and so on. It is through these multiple variations that an ‘Aha!’ arises, a vision which connects the structures and that carries the force of conviction.
Lebenswelt (life world) – the world as it is lived and experienced by conscious subjects – the world where we share knowledge which is useful for our ‘daily practices’ and our ‘daily circumstantial truths’.
Ref:
Kupers, W. (2009). The Status and Relevance of Phenomenology for Integral Research, Integral Review, 5 (1), 51-95.
Phenomenology via Kupers (1)
Because I’m but a novice in both phenomenology and Integral Theory, these series of posts will present more of a summary than a critical analysis of Wendlin Kupers’ paper (reference below).
This post summarises the first part of the paper, up to reviewing Husserlian phenomenology.
In this paper Kupers distinguishes a role for phenomenology that is broader than the role typically ascribed to phenomenology in the AQAL (all quadrants, all levels, all lines, all states, all types) models developed by Ken Wilber. Typcially, in describing the ‘domains of knowing’ that are the ground of the AQAL approach to human consciousness, Wilber presents subjective, objective, intersubjective and interobjective means of discourse as the four critical, and valid perspectives that must be considered in an all-encompassing framework of consciousness. Phenomenology is located in the subjective, or upper-left quadrant, in these models.
Kupers begins with an examination of Husserlian phenomenology, to move onto examining phenomenology via an inter-subjective lens. The work of Merleau-Ponty is reviewed to assess the possibilities for remedy for not only limitations to earlier models of phenomenology, but also for remedy of limitations with respect to integral theory, itself. Finally, Kupers offers an approach called ‘pheno-practice’ which seeks to enhance integral research in an empirical way.
Phenomenology is introduced by Kupers as per Merleau-Ponty’s definition as a flexible and vivid way of inquiry, which consistently explores new ways of reasoning. Phenomenology deals with the appearances of things, specifically ‘things that appear in human experience’. This is not only a realism, it is a reasoned enquiry as to the appearances in consciousness that humans encounter. Phenomenon means ‘that which reveals itself’ – and as per Heidegger, phenomenologists typically seek to let a thing speak for itself.
Phenomenology therefore examines the content of our consciousness (it’s meaning) and also the way that we perceive things (how we know). Phenomena in this way are not located in a theoretical nexus, but an embedded personal and cultural context. As personal, a phenomenological account is also a subjective account.
Husserl introduced a process called ‘bracketing’ in an attempt to overcome the Cartesian divide between subject and object, and to set aside psychologism, historicism and scientism to explore the subjective position. In this way the objective world is ‘proved’ through subjective account – ontology becomes epistemology.
Per Kupers, Husserl tried to investigate the formal qualities of reality which human beings become aware of in experience. He was searching for a way to uncover the experiencing of phenomena in their most primordial roots of pre-reflective consciousness to their exemplification in science. Correspondingly, a phenomenologist distinguishes between how phenomena are experienced (noesis) from how they appear in a subject’s awareness (noemata), distinguishing structures of consciousness from essences. Thus does phenomenology examine objects, and how we relate to these objects, as a content of consciousness.
Following Brentano, Husserl explored intentionality as the notion that consciousness is always oriented to things in the world – consciousness always being of or about something or someone. The mode of directing our consciousness to something is distinct from what is represented – consciousness reaches out beyond it’s own acts to the phenomena (otherwise known as the anti-representationalist stance). In this way, objectivity of things is co-constituted by structures that have meaning value.
What we observe in phenomenology is not the object itself, but how it is given in intentional acts.
Transcendental phenomenology becomes the study of the basic components of the meanings that are made possible by intentionality – as accomplished by transcendental subjectivity. In phenomenology, we are not concerned with situating consciousness within a naturalistic framework – rather consciousness arises within an overarching transcendental dimension, with non-psychological reflection. There is no otherworldly homunculus – the empirical subject and the transcendental subject are but two ways of conceiving the same subjectivity. In the first one is aware of oneself as causally determined known object, in the other we are aware of ourselves as knowing subjects, at the limit of the world.
For phenomenology, to know essences, all assumptions about the existence of the external world must be suspended. We do this by bracketing – framing out the ubiquitous background of everyday life. A personally or socially significant phenomena is investigated as an experience, not as a conceptualisation.
Phenomenological methodology includes techniques of epoche, bracketing, reduction and free variation (see ‘Phenomenology Definitions’ post, to follow). These become the cornerstones of suspended judgement, necessary for phenomenological inquiry. For Husserl a methodological freeing from culturally prevalent habits of thought brought a ‘new universal direction for our interest’, which he compared to spiritual conversion.
‘By consciously investigating the phenomena of life that we habitually take for granted, the world changes before our eyes and reveals the mysterious lining of the all embracing world horizon and the entwining of each thing with universal being. The world then becomes the universal field into which all our experiencing, understanding and doing are directed. To investigate the relational structure of consciousness and meaning of this plenum of the world as they reveal themselves to reflective consciousness became the task of phenomenology ever since Husserl.’ (p. 58)
Naive unexamined experience is thus transformed into a reflexive or second-order one, a one made more vivid in highlighting consciousness to itself.
As a transcendental philosophy, Husserlian phenomenology is interested in possibility conditions and foundations for knowledge moreso than psychological process. It tries to uncover the invariant formal principles by which consciousness operates in order to be constitutive. After investigation, the intuited object is communicated beyond private ascertainment, usually via language or symbolic inscription. The description however is a constitutive part of the phenomenological approach and is accepted to shape experience as much as the experience shapes the distinction. We are not talking about an ‘encoding’, rather an ‘embodiment’ that incarnates precisely what we experience. For Husserl, the objective truths of science must be recognised as grounded in living acts of human consciousness in relation to worldly phenomena. Man and world are first and foremost in relation – only at the second level, the reflective level of logic do we divide subject and object into separate entities.
The life-world is the ground of established scientific activity, the place where common-sense phenomena become the object of investigation. Modern science to an extent conceals the life world under scientific representations. Life-worldly phenomena has intersubjective and socio-cultural relationship, and in this way can be seen to extend outside of Wilber’s upper left quadrant in the AQAL framework.
Ref:
Kupers, W. (2009). The Status and Relevance of Phenomenology for Integral Research, Integral Review, 5 (1), 51-95.
Sunday, July 4, 2010
Re-thinking the Enlightenment - Susan Neiman
Listening to Philosophy Bites recently, I was intrigued by an interview with Susan Neiman, Director of the Einstein Forum, who proposes that we have yet to fully and deeply appreciate and reconcile the values introduced to our culture, apropos The Enlightenment.
She uses much 'we' language in the interview - I like this, in this context, because by virtue of it she hands us back the responsibility, as Westerners, to examine how, and why, Fundamentalism becomes attractive to some people in a liberal culture. She asks us to examine what we of progressive Western values have done to provoke conservative response - to consider is it possible that part of what is sought in Fundamental movements is an attempt retrieve something more than what materialistic late capitalism provides. By establishing that this is the case, we can start to review what might be sought in terms of values by those that orient to conservative modes of being and dialectic.
She then prods and pokes the Enlightenment, to reveal four robust values that may have self-transformative potential, and thus may have been undervalued, in our rush away from the perceived emphasis on reason, to the exclusion of all other modes of knowing, in unfortunate by-products of the aftermath (ha!) of the Age of Rationalism.
Firstly, Neiman proposes we re-visit happiness - to look at the relativism with which it might be considered, but to not capitulate to that relativism. By this means, we can know that 'money does not but happiness', and we can be prevented from projecting happiness into a Golden Age in the past or the Heavenly future. Self-criticism may ask that we intervene on behalf of others, to fully express our own happiness - happiness is not an end-state passive consumption, but an active principle of giving back to the world.
The second Enlightenment value she asks that we look at is reason - not the caricatured emotionless, passionless version of reason, rather the opposition to blind authority that reason can represent. The Enlightenment asks in the public sphere that we jsutify and argue about our reasons in a transparent way.
The third value is reverence - the Enlightenment may have been against institutionalised religion, but the demand to ethically think for yourself is at the beginning of the Hebrew Bible, and Neiman leans on this to present a reverence through the principle of understanding - a seeking to engage, in awe of, and in gratitude extended to, that which we seek to know. Whatever the world is, we know that we did not make it, and Neiman proposes that this recognition may indeed be a reconciling factor between the secular and the religious.
The final value is hope. In necessary industrial progress, no century was more concerned with the existence of evil - they made fun of optimism (as per Voltaire's Candide) but they did believe that human beings could lend effort to improve the world. 300 years ago it was standard for people to be drawn and quartered in the centre of town, with tickets sold. Torture, in this form, was abolished, and intriguingly, we have it back now. The Enlightenment offered regression, at the same time as progress, and the existence of both of these principles, simultaneously, is something worthwhile to consider in light of Cheney and Rumsfeld and the power of certain individuals in power. She comes out as rejecting pessimism as cowardly, and proposes that in light of the chance for human action to make a difference, we become responsible for ourselves, and others.
The interview was more interesting to listen to than I seem to have made it sound here. I think, partly, I'm a little bit in love with the reactionary idea, that the Enlightenment has more crunchy goodness in it than we've extracted from our historical Caesar Salad, yet.
She uses much 'we' language in the interview - I like this, in this context, because by virtue of it she hands us back the responsibility, as Westerners, to examine how, and why, Fundamentalism becomes attractive to some people in a liberal culture. She asks us to examine what we of progressive Western values have done to provoke conservative response - to consider is it possible that part of what is sought in Fundamental movements is an attempt retrieve something more than what materialistic late capitalism provides. By establishing that this is the case, we can start to review what might be sought in terms of values by those that orient to conservative modes of being and dialectic.
She then prods and pokes the Enlightenment, to reveal four robust values that may have self-transformative potential, and thus may have been undervalued, in our rush away from the perceived emphasis on reason, to the exclusion of all other modes of knowing, in unfortunate by-products of the aftermath (ha!) of the Age of Rationalism.
Firstly, Neiman proposes we re-visit happiness - to look at the relativism with which it might be considered, but to not capitulate to that relativism. By this means, we can know that 'money does not but happiness', and we can be prevented from projecting happiness into a Golden Age in the past or the Heavenly future. Self-criticism may ask that we intervene on behalf of others, to fully express our own happiness - happiness is not an end-state passive consumption, but an active principle of giving back to the world.
The second Enlightenment value she asks that we look at is reason - not the caricatured emotionless, passionless version of reason, rather the opposition to blind authority that reason can represent. The Enlightenment asks in the public sphere that we jsutify and argue about our reasons in a transparent way.
The third value is reverence - the Enlightenment may have been against institutionalised religion, but the demand to ethically think for yourself is at the beginning of the Hebrew Bible, and Neiman leans on this to present a reverence through the principle of understanding - a seeking to engage, in awe of, and in gratitude extended to, that which we seek to know. Whatever the world is, we know that we did not make it, and Neiman proposes that this recognition may indeed be a reconciling factor between the secular and the religious.
The final value is hope. In necessary industrial progress, no century was more concerned with the existence of evil - they made fun of optimism (as per Voltaire's Candide) but they did believe that human beings could lend effort to improve the world. 300 years ago it was standard for people to be drawn and quartered in the centre of town, with tickets sold. Torture, in this form, was abolished, and intriguingly, we have it back now. The Enlightenment offered regression, at the same time as progress, and the existence of both of these principles, simultaneously, is something worthwhile to consider in light of Cheney and Rumsfeld and the power of certain individuals in power. She comes out as rejecting pessimism as cowardly, and proposes that in light of the chance for human action to make a difference, we become responsible for ourselves, and others.
The interview was more interesting to listen to than I seem to have made it sound here. I think, partly, I'm a little bit in love with the reactionary idea, that the Enlightenment has more crunchy goodness in it than we've extracted from our historical Caesar Salad, yet.
Thursday, July 1, 2010
Intercept of Time and Timelessness
From TS Elliot's 'Dry Salvages':
'Men's curiosity searches past and future
And clings to that dimension. But to apprehend
The point of intersection of the timeless
With time, is an occupation for the saint--
No occupation either, but something given
And taken, in a lifetime's death in love,
Ardour and selflessness and self-surrender.
For most of us, there is only the unattended
Moment, the moment in and out of time.'
Monday, June 21, 2010
Connectedness
'It is not as if an 'I' exists independently over here and then simply loses a 'you' over there, especially if the attachment to 'you' is a part of what composes who 'I' am as well. I think I have lost 'you' only to discover 'I' have gone missing as well. There is a relationality that is composed neither exclusively of myself nor you, but it is to be conceived as the tie by which those terms are differentiated and related.'
Butler, J. (2003). Violence, Mourning, Politics. Studies in Gender and Sexuality, 4, 9-37.
Butler, J. (2003). Violence, Mourning, Politics. Studies in Gender and Sexuality, 4, 9-37.
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